

Ethical Issues Arising from Neurotechnology

Hongkun Chen

*School of International Education, University of International Business and Economics - Highline Program, Beijing, China
19858523311@163.com*

Abstract. Rapid advances in neuroscience are expanding the capacity to measure, interpret and modulate neural activity. Brain–computer interfaces, neuroimaging, neuromodulation and AI-based brain-data analysis may improve treatment, communication support and scientific understanding. However, their growing use also creates ethical challenges that cannot be resolved by technical safety alone. This article examines the ethical implications of neurotechnology through privacy, justice and inequality because it is motivated by the concern that public awareness, practical safeguards and enforceable governance have not kept pace with innovation. Based on a qualitative review and normative analysis of recent neuroethics literature, the article considers the sensitivity of brain data, the need for transparent and fair decision-making, and the risk that unequal access and biased algorithms may create new forms of disadvantage. The analysis suggests that current approaches often focus on safety and informed consent, while offering limited practical guidance on secondary data use, institutional decision-making and remedies for harm. The article argues that governance should be anticipatory, rights-based and participatory, combining meaningful consent, independent oversight, inclusive research, bias assessment and fair access. These measures are essential if neurotechnology is to advance human well-being rather than deepen exclusion as it moves into wider clinical, commercial and social settings.

Keywords: Neurotechnology, Neuroethics, Brain Data, Governance, Inequality

1. Introduction

In recent decades, Neuroscience has developed rapidly. It is no longer a field that only observes the nervous system, but can also measure, interpret and, in selected cases, influence brain activity. Advances in neuroimaging, electrophysiology, artificial intelligence (AI), biosensors and biomedical engineering allow researchers and clinicians to collect neural information with greater speed and precision. This change matters because the brain is closely connected with memory, emotion, attention, decision-making and behaviour. Neurotechnology is therefore not simply a set of medical tools; it may also change how people are understood, assessed and treated in society.

Current neurotechnology covers several connected areas. EEG and other electrophysiological techniques record electrical activity on the scalp or within the brain. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) offers different information about neural activity and brain structure. Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) translate some neural signals into commands for computers or assistive

devices. Neuromodulation methods, including deep-brain stimulation (DBS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), aim to influence neural circuits for therapeutic purposes. AI systems can also find patterns in large sets of neural, clinical and behavioural data. Some systems are "closed loop": they collect signals, analyse them and adjust feedback or stimulation in response. In this way, neuroscience increasingly connects laboratories, hospitals, homes and commercial markets.

These developments offer important benefits. A BCI may help a person with severe paralysis communicate or control an assistive device. Neuromodulation may reduce symptoms for some people with Parkinson's disease, epilepsy, chronic pain, depression or other disorders. Better analysis of neural data may also support more personalised care. Yet the movement from experiment to clinical use should not be judged only by striking demonstrations or commercial interest. "Reality Check for Brain–Machine Interfaces" notes that, as such technologies move towards clinical translation, realistic expectations, patient access, user-centred design and long-term support all matter [1]. An intervention can be technically innovative while still failing to meet users' real needs.

At the same time, these technologies can affect individuals in more intimate ways than many other digital tools. Neural signals do not provide a complete record of private thought, and current systems cannot simply read the mind. However, they may indicate motor intention, fatigue, attention, mood or other features of a person's condition. When neural data are combined with speech, facial images, medical records or behavioural data, they can form detailed personal profiles. In closed-loop systems, data may also be used to guide an intervention. The system does not only observe a user; it may classify a state, recommend an action or change stimulation. This raises questions about consent, data control, accountability and the ability to challenge decisions. It can also blur the boundary between therapeutic support and behavioural influence.

Ethical issues are not limited to data privacy. Invasive BCIs can involve surgery, device failure, long-term care and unequal access to follow-up support. Consumer devices may raise other concerns, including unreliable claims, workplace pressure and the secondary use of data. Neurotechnology can also affect agency, identity, power and fairness when it influences how people make choices or how others evaluate them. Soldado-Magraner et al. apply the IEEE BRAIN Neuroethics Framework to intracortical BCIs and show that ethical assessment should cover safety and well-being, agency and identity, authority and power, justice and fairness, and surveillance and privacy [2]. Ethics must therefore be considered in design, research, clinical use and wider adoption, rather than added only after harm.

Personal autonomy is especially important in this context. People should be able to make informed choices about whether to accept neurotechnology, what data it collects and how it may affect their future opportunities. Muñoz, Bernácer and Güell describe personal autonomy as a neuroright that protects the capacity to direct one's own life, together with freedom of thought [3]. Technology may appear voluntary, but that choice is weakened if refusal leads to exclusion, higher costs or lost opportunities.

This paper examines the ethical effects of rapid neuroscience development through three connected issues. First, it considers privacy, focusing on the protection and governance of brain data. Second, it discusses justice, including fair research practices, access to treatment and the use of neurotechnology in legal or institutional decisions. Third, it focuses on inequality, asking how high costs, unequal research participation and biased algorithms may widen existing social divisions. The paper argues that neuroscience should be guided not only by technical performance and market value, but also by human dignity, personal autonomy, procedural fairness and social inclusion. Public trust in these technologies depends on a credible commitment to these values.

2. Body

2.1. Privacy

The rapid development of neuroscience will lead to the emergence of some new issues related to privacy. Privacy protection of brain data is an important challenge. Brain data is more sensitive than most forms of personal information. It is not only related to physiological states such as heart rate and sleep, but also can be used to infer attention, mood or cognitive state. In closed-loop neurotechnology, a system continuously records neural signals and analyses the user's condition through an algorithm. Then it provides stimulation or feedback. Adaptive deep-brain stimulation which adjusts treatment parameters according to neural states is a representative example. This cycle of "collection–analysis–intervention" makes data use continuous and difficult to predict fully. Haag et al. note that ethical issues in research on closed-loop neurotechnology are often addressed only implicitly within technical or procedural discussions, rather than through systematic ethical assessment [4]. This shows that this problem is difficult to overcome at present.

The privacy problems brought about by brain data can also be combined with other aspects. The ethical problems will be more serious when they are combined with artificial intelligence or other data. When individual brain data is combined with facial expressions or certain behaviors, it may form highly accurate personal characteristics. Gilbert and Russo screened 1,017 articles and analyzed 569 relevant ones, 91% of which suggested that brain-reading could enable mind-reading now or in the future. However, current technology remains far from science-fiction mind-reading, while privacy and data-exploitation risks remain [5]. This conclusion indicates that although the ethical issues are not particularly serious, the risk of data being monitored or exploited cannot be ignored.

In conclusion, the issue of mental privacy such as brain data is not merely about confidentiality. It is even more about ensuring that individuals have control over their own data. There should be a balance between data sharing among research institutions and individual users. Researchers should tell individuals which data is collected and whether it is used for algorithm training and who can access it. For example, brain data cannot be used for commercialization without consent. The "Data Hazards" framework proposed by Román García et al. further argues that ethical risks should be identified throughout the lifecycle of research, like from design and data collection to analysis and publication, rather than addressed only after harm occurs [6]. Therefore, the ethical protection of brain data is not merely about whether consent is given. It is more about respecting the right to personal information of individuals.

2.2. Justice

Justice in neuroscience can be divided into distributive justice and procedural justice. The ethical issues in distributive justice as they relate to neuroscience mainly concern risks and benefits. In the field of neurotechnology research, patients must bear a great deal of risks, such as surgeries and information leakage issues, however, in the end, the profits usually go to researchers or enterprises. For instance, in the application of neuroscience in medicine, participants provide a large amount of data sources. However, the high prices and maintenance costs of neural devices such as implantable brain-computer interfaces may prevent some patients with mental illnesses from affording them, resulting in the loss of treatment. Cabrera and Weber argue that access, equity, and the management of public expectations are important ethical priorities for BCIs [7]. This indicates that

neurotechnology such as brain-computer interfaces should help people with severe mental illnesses regain their basic life skills rather than merely serving as a source of data.

Procedural justice is also important. Although the rapid development of neural technology has broadened its application scope, there are still ethical issues in the application of neural technology in some judicial procedures. Robertson et al. noted that current governance discussions do not give enough attention to the views of different regions and social groups [8]. The 2008 Indian case *State of Maharashtra v. Sharma* provides a cautionary example. A trial court in Pune used BEOS brainwave detection results as part of the evidence and sentenced Aditi Sharma to life imprisonment. Gaudet notes that this case demonstrates how technological evidence may still influence criminal judgments and undermine the defendant's right to a fair trial if the scientific reliability of brainwave detection is not fully validated [9]. In 2010, the Supreme Court of India ruled in *Selvi v. State of Karnataka* that the forced administration of tests such as brainstem auditory evoked potentials (BAEP) violated the right against self-incrimination [10]. This case demonstrates that current neuroscience cannot fully serve as evidence to guide the outcome of judicial decisions.

2.3. Inequality

Neurotechnology may exacerbate social inequality. Due to the high price and cost of neurotechnology, these technologies are likely to be first adopted by those who have better economic conditions or access to abundant medical resources. If BCIs, cognitive-enhancement devices and personalized neurotherapies mainly serve privileged populations, they may become a new source of competitive advantage. Those who possess these technologies can gain more benefits in their studies or work, while others will thus lose the opportunity to receive education or employment. This could lead to a continuous widening of social disparities, thereby giving rise to ethical issues.

This risk is also supported by policy research and public opinion data. In its report *Neurotechnology and Society: Strengthening Responsible Innovation in Brain Science*, the OECD warns that cognitive enhancement may give users unfair advantages in education and employment [11]. In 2016, Pew Research Center surveyed 4,726 U.S. adults. As shown in figure 1, the survey found that 32% would want a brain chip that improves attention and information processing, while 66% would not. In addition, 73% believed that such technology would increase social inequality because it would initially be affordable only to wealthy people [12].




Figure 1. 4,726 American adults survey [11]

What's more, the unequal application of neurotechnology will lead to unequal capabilities among individuals. Gaudry et al. observe that neurotechnology already has the potential to affect memory, attention, mood and physical capability [13]. This means that people can create unequal competition through neurotechnology. For instance, students can utilize certain neural technologies to enhance their memory and concentration, thereby enabling them to achieve better academic results. Similarly, workers can employ these technologies to improve their efficiency and physical capabilities.

Guidance from UNESCO emphasizes human rights, inclusion, equity and responsible innovation as central principles for neurotechnology governance [14]. It shows that when neural technology cannot be utilized properly, it will exacerbate the existing disparities or create new differences.

3. Discussion

Current ethical guidance on neurotechnology recognises privacy, autonomy, safety and fairness as central concerns, yet its practical effect remains limited. Many recommendations are voluntary, high-level or designed mainly for research settings. They offer general principles but few operational standards for data retention, secondary use, algorithmic validation, device maintenance, cross-border data sharing or remedies when harm occurs. In practice, this may leave important decisions to individual companies, hospitals or research teams, whose commercial incentives and capacities can differ widely.

These limitations will become more serious as neurotechnology moves beyond specialist clinical care. Closed-loop systems can continuously collect neural data and adjust feedback or stimulation. AI systems may combine neural signals with clinical, behavioural and commercial data. Consumer devices may also introduce neurotechnology into workplaces, schools and homes, where users may face pressure to accept monitoring or enhancement. The ethical risk is therefore not only that data may be misused. It is also that inaccurate or biased systems may influence employment, insurance, education or legal decisions without clear accountability.

Future governance should be adaptive and proportionate to risk. High-risk applications, particularly invasive devices and systems used for institutional decision-making, require robust pre-deployment assessment, independent review and long-term monitoring. Developers should conduct regular bias and impact assessments, while users need accessible routes to question decisions, withdraw consent and seek redress. Public authorities should also support equitable access to clinically necessary technologies and prevent enhancement tools from becoming exclusive sources of advantage.

Finally, governance cannot be limited to a single country or discipline. Researchers, engineers, clinicians, legal experts, disabled persons and the public should participate in setting standards. International cooperation can promote minimum safeguards while allowing rules to reflect local health-care needs. Such a framework can help ensure that neuroscience remains innovative without losing sight of dignity, fairness and public trust.

4. Conclusion

The rapid development of neuroscience has expanded the ability to observe, interpret and intervene in neural activity. Its clinical potential is substantial, especially for people with paralysis, neurological disease and severe mental-health conditions. However, the analysis in this paper shows that technological capability alone cannot determine whether neurotechnology is socially acceptable.

Its effects depend on the rules that govern data, the procedures that shape decision-making, and the conditions under which benefits and burdens are distributed.

First, brain data requires a higher level of protection than ordinary personal information. Because neural information may be linked to cognition, emotion and behaviour, meaningful protection must include data minimisation, purpose limitation, transparent communication and the practical ability to withdraw or refuse consent. Second, justice requires both fair outcomes and fair processes. Research participants, patients and people affected by neurotechnology in legal settings should receive clear information, independent review and effective ways to challenge decisions. Technologies should not be accepted simply because they appear scientifically advanced; their reliability, risks and social consequences must also be examined. Third, neurotechnology may deepen existing inequalities if expensive therapeutic and enhancement tools are concentrated among wealthy groups, or if algorithms are trained on narrow populations. Public investment should therefore prioritise clinically necessary applications, while research and product development should include diverse participants and regular bias audits. Governments, researchers, companies, clinicians, disabled people and the public should share responsibility for shaping these rules.

Privacy, justice and inequality are not separate concerns. Weak privacy protections can facilitate discrimination; unfair procedures can undermine trust; and unequal access can turn technological benefits into new forms of privilege. For this reason, neurotechnology governance should be anticipatory, rights-based and participatory. Ethical review must continue throughout design, testing, deployment and long-term use. Neuroscience will best serve human well-being not when it advances most quickly, but when innovation remains accountable to human dignity, autonomy, fairness and inclusion.

References

- [1] Reality check for brain–machine interfaces. (2024). *Nature Reviews Bioengineering*, 2, 627. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s44222-024-00230-0>
- [2] Soldado-Magraner, J., Antonietti, A., French, J., Higgins, N., Young, M. J., Larrivee, D., & Monteleone, R. (2024). Applying the IEEE BRAIN neuroethics framework to intra-cortical brain–computer interfaces. *Journal of Neural Engineering*, 21(2), 022001. <https://doi.org/10.1088/1741-2552/ad3852>
- [3] Muñoz, J. M., Bernácer, J., & Güell, F. (2023). A conceptual framework to safeguard the neuroright to personal autonomy. *Neuroethics*, 16, 18. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-023-09523-4>
- [4] Haag, L., Starke, G., Ploner, M., & Ienca, M. (2025). Ethical gaps in closed-loop neurotechnology: A scoping review. *npj Digital Medicine*, 8(1), 510. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41746-025-01908-4>
- [5] Gilbert, F., & Russo, I. (2024). Mind-reading in AI and neurotechnology: Evaluating claims, hype, and ethical implications for neurorights. *AI and Ethics*, 4(3), 855–872. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-024-00514-6>
- [6] Román García, S., Welsh, C., Di Cara, N. H., Sterratt, D. C., Romanò, N., & Stefan, M. I. (2025). Data hazards as an ethical toolkit for neuroscience. *Neuroethics*, 18(1), 15. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12152-024-09580-3>
- [7] Cabrera, L. Y., & Weber, D. J. (2023). Rethinking the ethical priorities for brain–computer interfaces. *Nature Electronics*, 6(2), 99–101. <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41928-023-00928-w>
- [8] Robertson, L. J., Higgins, N. L., Maier, M. J., Carter, A., & Gardner, J. G. (2025). Ethical governance strategies for the responsible innovation of neurotechnologies: A scoping review. *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry*, 22(4), 931–948. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11673-025-10440-9>
- [9] Gaudet, L. M. (2011). Brain fingerprinting, scientific evidence, and "Daubert": A cautionary lesson from India. *Jurimetrics: The Journal of Law, Science & Technology*, 51(3), 293–318. <https://doi.org/10.2307/41307131>
- [10] Supreme Court of India. (2010, May 5). Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr. Criminal Appeal No. 1267 of 2004; (2010) 7 SCC 263. https://cdnbbsr.s3waas.gov.in/s3ec0490f1f4972d133619a60c30f3559e/documents/aor_notice_circular/26.pdf
- [11] Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2017, November 30). Neurotechnology and society: Strengthening responsible innovation in brain science. *OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers*, No. 46. OECD Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.1787/f31e10ab-en>

- [12] Funk, C. (2016, August 4). Why Americans are wary of using technology to "enhance" humans. *Pew Research Center*. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2016/08/04/why-americans-are-wary-of-using-technology-to-enhance-humans/>
- [13] Gaudry, K. S., Ayaz, H., Bedows, A., Celnik, P., Eagleman, D., Grover, P., Illes, J., Rao, R. P. N., Robinson, J. T., Thyagarajan, K., & The Working Group on Brain-Interfacing Devices in 2040. (2021). Projections and the potential societal impact of the future of neurotechnologies. *Frontiers in Neuroscience*, 15, 658930. <https://doi.org/10.3389/fnins.2021.658930>
- [14] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). (2025, November 11). Recommendation on the ethics of neurotechnology. *UNESCO*. <https://www.unesco.org/en/legal-affairs/recommendation-ethics-neurotechnology?hub=66535>